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I. INTRODUCTION
Does a person with a substantial amount of marketable securities
have any opportunities to save taxes which are incurred as a result of
the ownership of his portfolio? The reaction of most tax practitioners
would probably be that there are no planning devices which are peculiar
to this type of investment. In fact, the government has already closed
one big loophole by enacting the personal holding company provisions.'
That legislation, in combination with the classic double taxation
effect which a corporation produces,' is generally thought to make the
use of the corporate vehicle totally impractical for the purpose of holding
these types of liquid assets. However, as will be demonstrated by the
analysis of this article, the incorporation of a portfolio may produce highly
beneficial tax results in the proper circumstances, provided that the estab-
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 541 et seq., and section V infra. [All references to the
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 are hereinafter cited in the text by section (§) without
further description].
2. For a full explanation and analysis of the "Double Taxation Effect," see B. BrrKxER
& J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS j 1.03 (3d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as BITTEER & EuSaTCE].
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lishment of the plan is tempered with competent advice and later sub-
jected to periodic review.
II. OBJECTIVES, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF THE PLAN
A. Objectives
The basic goals of the plan are threefold: (1) to reduce the burden
of federal estate taxes on the assets subjected to the plan with a minimum
of gift tax consequences; (2) to avoid adverse income tax consequences,
and possibly provide some substantial income tax benefits to the original
owner of the portfolio and his family unit; and (3) to allow the owner
to maintain the same economic control and flexibility in making invest-
ment decisions with regard to the portfolio as he would have had if
his individual ownership had continued. For convenience, the initial
owner of the stocks and securities who will be the main object of the
plan set out in this article will be referred to as the owner-transferor.
B. Establishment and Basic Corporate Structure
The estate tax advantages of the plan would be accomplished through
the capital structure of the corporation. Therefore, one consideration in
determining the types of stocks and securities to be transferred to the
corporation should be estate planning.'
A combination of non-convertible preferred stocks and debt securi-
ties with a total face amount and/or liquidation value approximating the
total fair market value of the portfolio should be transferred to the
owner-transferor by a newly-formed corporation in a transaction which
has no tax effects.' The remaining stock (which will be common) is
issued to the objects of the owner-transferor's bounty (his family).
The effect of this type of capitalization for estate planning is to
prevent the value of the owner-transferor's estate from increasing any
further since, by their nature, the preferred stock and debt securities
which will be transferred to him will not appreciate substantially if
at all. In effect, all future appreciation of the owner-transferor's portfolio
has been shifted to his family at no gift tax or estate tax cost. Additionally,
the value of the stock and securities he would hold in this close corpora-
tion may have a lower value for estate tax purposes than that of the
underlying marketable stocks and securities to be held by the corpora-
tion.5
In order to retain control of the portfolio, the owner-transferor's
preferred stock would be voting, and the common issued to his beneficiaries
would be non-voting. It should be noted that such retention of voting
control may amount to a "tainted retained power" in connection with a
3. See section II(D) infra.
4. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351; section III infra.
5. See section X infra.
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gratuitous transfer which would cause the common stock to be included
in the owner-transferor's estate under § 2036(a) or § 2038. A full dis-
cussion of the application of these sections and the possible means of
avoiding their application will be taken up at a later point in this article."
The interest and dividend rates on the debt securities and the
preferred stock would be sufficient to provide the owner-transferor with
the income that he desires. Also, the owner-transferor has the option to
make gifts of his stock in the newly formed corporation at a later time
without the risk of further appreciation which would cause greater estate
and gift tax burdens.
C. Alternatives and Modifications Regarding Capital Structure-
Basic Considerations
Several variations on this basic type of capitalization are also pos-
sible. One would be to make the preferred stock senior to the common
as to assets upon liquidation, but not as to dividends. This would pro-
vide for flexibility in shifting income among family members, but
would not jeopardize the owner-transferor's needs for income since he
would retain voting control of the corporation as stated above. It should
be noted that this type of arrangement would not be feasible with regard
to the debt securities since it would probably result in their being classi-
fied as equity securities.7
Another alternative would be to make only a small portion (in
terms of value) of the preferred stock voting. This would facilitate the
making of gifts of the stock in the future without requiring the owner-
transferor to relinquish any degree of corporate control.
Certainly there are other possible variations and additional con-
siderations in the area of determining the exact nature of the initial
capital structure, but they must be made in light of all the circumstances
existing at the time the transfer is effected. Some of these additional
factors are considered in the discussion which follows.
1. GIFT TAX VALUATION OF COMMON STOCK
Assuming there is a gift inherent in the transfer of the common stock,
what value should be given to it for gift tax purposes? This is a matter
which is largely within the control of the owner-transferor at the time
of the initial transfer. One reasonable approach would be to value the
common stock as the excess of the fair market value of all the corporate
assets over the liquidation values of all the senior stock and securities.
Since the holders of the common shares would have no voting rights and
therefore no control over the corporation, a substantial discount from the
value as determined above could probably be justified. Under this method,
6. See section XI infra.
7. See section IV infra.
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the gift tax value of the common could be varied in order to produce the
desired gift tax consequences." One possible approach would be to make
the value of the common equal to the maximum amount the owner-
transferor could give away with no gift tax effect.
2. DEBT VERSUS EQUITY
How much debt (in comparison with equity) should be issued? The
answer to this question is governed, in part, by tax considerations, i.e.,
the thin capitalization rules."l The interest should be sufficient to minimize
the adverse effects of double taxation, but, as mentioned previously, the
fixed interest obligation of debt securities may prevent some advantageous
use of income splitting. In making decisions on the initial capitalization,
these and other factors must be considered in light of the particular
circumstances.
3. INTEREST AND DIVIDEND RATES ON FIXED INCOME SECURITIES
What should the stated interest and dividend rates be on the debt
securities and preferred stock? Some reasonable interest rate should be
provided for on the debt to avoid serious valuation problems and to avoid
the possible application of the imputed interest rules." Also the interest
should be sufficient to minimize the effects of double taxation. 2 Other
possible considerations in determining the interest and dividend rates are
the owner-transferor's needs for income, the effect on the income shifting
possibilities, 8 and the availability of funds to satisfy these obligations.
D. Type of Assets to be Transferred to the Corporation
What types of stocks and securities should be transferred to the
corporation? Since the basic objective of the plan is to avoid estate taxes
on future appreciation of the portfolio, there would be no point in trans-
ferring large amounts of non-appreciating stocks and securities (such as
non-convertible bonds and preferred stocks) to the corporation. The
bulk of the stocks and securities transferred to the corporation should be
8. See section X infra for a general discussion of valuation of closely held stock. It
should also be noted that there are other possible methods of valuation for gift tax purposes-
for example, all of the stocks and securities issued by the incorporated portfolio could be
independently valued. It would seem, however, that any reasonable method could be effec-
tively argued since valuation is almost always a question of fact. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
CuM. BULL. 237 § 3.01. -
9. This plan assumes that the donor could take advantage of the specific exemption
permitted by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2521 and the annual exclusion authorized by INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
10. See section IV(B) (2) infra.
11. INT. RED. CODE OF 1954, § 483; Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b)(3)(i) (1966).
12. See section VI(C) infra for a detailed discussion of the method of accomplishing this
objective.
13. See section IV(A) inIra.
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those likely to appreciate-common stocks, convertible bonds and con-
vertible preferred stocks. Of course, some non-appreciating securities
could be transferred to the corporation for the purpose of selling them
and re-investing in appreciating stocks and securities at a later date. 4
Another consideration in this area is the type of income which is
produced by the stocks or securities. As will be discussed more fully
later,'5 dividend income in the corporation will mitigate the double
taxation effects of the corporate structure because of the 85% dividends
received deduction, 6 while interest income, which would be produced
by convertible bonds, does not receive the benefit of this deduction.
However, depending on the amount of debt in the capital structure, some
of the interest income may be eliminated by payments of interest as an
expense.
It should also be noted that since stocks and securities with a high
potential for appreciation classically produce low income yields, the cor-
poration, if its portfolio is composed mainly of such securities, will have a
limited ability to pay fixed interest and preferred dividend obligations from
its income. This fact may weigh heavily in determining the interest and
dividend rates to be paid on the debt securities and preferred stock to be
issued as well as in determining the total amount of capitalization needed
to fund the payment of a fixed amount of cash each year.
E. Effect of the Personal Holding Company Tax
The second major objective of the plan is to prevent its income tax
consequences from being any more burdensome than if the portfolio had
been held by the owner-transferor. A number of problems in this area
are created by the personal holding company provisions. The fact that
these provisions will apply to the corporation17 makes it necessary as a
practical matter to pay out all of the company's earnings as dividends.' 8
Normally the result of paying earnings out as dividends is a "double tax"
-one at the corporate level on the income earned by the corporation,
and one at the individual level on the dividends paid out to the share-
holder.19
Since the tax at the corporate level may be as high as 48%20 and
the top individual rate is 70%2 the compound effect of these taxes could
14. It should be noted that this could be accomplished at a later date by means of a
tax-free contribution to capital. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 118, 362(b) and the Regula-
tions thereunder.
15. Section VI(C) infra.
16. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 243.
17. See section V infra.
18. See section V, VI infra.
19. See BrrTK E & EUSTICE, supra note 2.
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1.
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make a plan of this nature totally impractical.22 Of course, it is unlikely
that both the corporation and the shareholder will be in these brackets,
but even at lower rates, the double taxation effect may be substantial."
One mitigating factor in some cases is the benefit of splitting income
among several taxpayers (the corporation and its shareholders) to reduce
the effect of the progressive tax, but this benefit will exist only to the
extent the income may be spread among stockholders if, as is required
in the instant case, the corporation must pay all of its earnings out as
dividends. Another possible method of alleviating the double taxation
effect is to pay out the corporate earnings to or for the benefit of the
shareholders in the form of deductible expenses such as salaries, interest,
contributions to qualified pension and profit sharing plans and payments
pursuant to medical expense reimbursement plans.24 To a limited degree
such expenses may be justifiable under the plan in the instant case, but
since such deductions must qualify as "ordinary and necessary" expenses
for the production of income25 the amount of expenses which would be
allowable deductions are certainly limited, and would probably not be
sufficient to completely eliminate the double taxation effect.
If the corporate income is composed to a great extent of dividends
from domestic corporations,26 § 243 allows an 85% dividends received
deduction which would certainly alleviate the effect of double taxation
considerably. In addition, careful planning, through the use of the § 243
22. If both the corporation and the shareholder are in the top brackets, the overall tax
rate would amount to 84.4%.
23. If the corporation is in the 22% bracket and the shareholder is in the 50% bracket,
the overall tax rate will be 61%, or 11 percentage points higher than if the shareholder had
received the income as an individuaL
24. See section IX in/ra.
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162, 212 and the Regulations thereunder.
26. It is likely that the income of the corporation will be composed largely of dividends
on stocks of domestic corporations since the plan, as discussed previously in section II(D)
supra, is only applicable to a portfolio which has potential for substantial appreciation. It
should be noted in this respect that although convertible bonds may appreciate substantially,
the interest from such bonds does not receive the benefit of the dividends received deduction
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 243. This fact may limit the effectiveness of the plan with
regard to a portfolio composed largely of convertible bonds.
27. Assume, for example, that the corporate income is composed entirely of qualifying
dividends, the shareholders are alternatively in the 30%, 50%, and 70% brackets, and the
corporation is alternatively in the 22% and 48% brackets. In those cases, the overall tax
brackets may be summarized by the following tabulation:
Corporate Tax Bracket
Shareholders' Tax Bracket 48% 22%
30% 35.04% 32.31%
50% 53.60% 51.65%
70% 72.16% 70.99%
When contrasted with the information set forth at note 26 supra, this table reflects that the
double taxation effect is much less dramatic when the dividends received deduction is allow-
able. The table also demonstrates that the double taxation effect is reduced as the share-
holders tax bracket is increased.
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deduction, may, in certain circumstances, completely eliminate all income
taxes at the corporate level and therefore the double taxation effect.2
F. Capital Gains on Sale of Corporate Assets
Another major problem area is how to deal with capital gains as
they arise. Proper portfolio management may require purchases and sales
of securities at various intervals depending on the nature of the invest-
ments as well as many other factors. If the gain is not large or is mostly
offset by losses, it may be absorbed at the corporate level by expenses.
If the corporation has recognized a large gain there are two possible
alternatives, neither of which is highly desirable. One is to distribute
the gain as a current dividend. This, however, would cause the double
taxation effect to come into play. The second alternative is to retain the
gain in the corporation. This would be possible since such gains, if
long-term, are not considered personal holding company income. 9 How-
ever, this is not a desirable alternative since such gains increase earnings
and profits3 ° and therefore taxable dividend potential for future years.
Thus, under this alternative, the double taxation effect is merely deferred.
In addition, the building up of earnings and profits in this manner
prevents the utilization of an important degree of flexibility. By keeping
the earnings and profits of the corporation to a minimum, the bulk of
distributions from the corporation, other than those representing current
earnings and profits, will first be considered a tax-free return of capital,
and then a capital gain from the sale or exchange of stock."1 This permits
removal of assets from the corporation at any time with a minimum of
tax cost.82
G. Use of Property Distributions
1. LIQUIDITY AND SOLVING THE CAPITAL GAINS PROBLEM
Because it is probably possible to prevent recognition of gain at the
corporate level"3 on such distributions, the capital gains problem could
be solved by merely distributing the stocks to be sold to the shareholders
and permitting them to make the sales.34 The tax effect would be the same
or more favorable than if the shareholders owned the stocks individually
and sold them at a gain since only a capital gain, a tax-free basis recovery,
or some combination thereof, would occur as a result of the distributions.
28. See section VI(C) infra.
29. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 543, 545(b) (5). Also see section V infra.
30. See Rudick, "Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law:
Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1941); Albrecht, "Divi-
dends" and "Earnings or Profits," 7 TAx L. REv. 157 (1952).
31. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 301(c).
32. See section VII infra.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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This procedure may also have the effect of splitting the capital gain among
the various family members who are shareholders, if the stock is dis-
tributed ratably among them.
2. RETENTION OF CORPORATE ASSETS
If it is desired that the corporation retain the value relating to these
assets and reinvest it in other stocks or securities, the proceeds from the
sale could be recontributed to the corporation as a tax-free contribution
of capital,8" or if all requirements were met, a tax-free transfer to a con-
trolled corporation.8" In either case, the shareholders would receive an
increase in the basis of their stock to the extent of the basis of any assets
contributed,"1 and the basis of the contributed assets to the corporation
would be the same as the basis of such assets in the hands of the trans-
ferring shareholders. 8s The increased shareholder basis could produce the
additional advantage that future distributions of appreciated assets
would, to a greater extent, be a tax-free recovery of basis.
The main problem with the recontribution of the proceeds to the
corporation is the possible application of the step-transaction doctrine 9
which has been applied in a similar context to complete liquidations
followed by reincorporation." As applied to the instant situation, the
distribution of the stock, its sale by the shareholders, and the recon-
tribution of the proceeds could be considered mere steps in a plan, the
overall effect of which is to have the corporation itself sell the stock.
The recognition of gain by the corporation would, of course, defeat
the purpose of the scheme. To avoid the possible application of the step
transaction doctrine, the recontribution of the proceeds could be elimi-
nated or delayed for a substantial period (possibly a year) after the sale.
3. RISK OF GAIN RECOGNITION AT THE CORPORATE LEVEL
Although the risk of a corporate capital gain is not great if the
property distributions are properly planned, several additional alternative
methods of handling the corporate capital gains problems will be con-
sidered. One possibility is to plan the realization of capital gains at the
corporate level so that they may be eliminated by capital losses or
other corporate expenses. Careful projections of potential gains in
setting up the capital structure could make considerable excess interest
deductions available to wipe out corporate gains since the amount of
interest expense needed to completely eliminate dividend income is only
15% thereof.41
35. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 118.
36. IsT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351; section III infra.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 358.
38. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 362(a).
39. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 2, IT 1.05, at 1-19 to 1-20.
40. Id. 11 11.05.
41. See section VI(C) infra.
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For example, assume a portfolio consisting solely of common stocks
in domestic corporations with a value of $1,000,000 and an annual divi-
dend yield thereon of approximately 3% or $30,000. Assume further
that the corporation is capitalized with $500,000 of 20 year, 6% bonds,
or an annual interest obligation of $30,000. Ignoring other possible
deductible expenses or capital losses, the corporation would have $25,500
in deductions available to absorb possible capital gains."2
The defect in this scheme is that earnings and profits would be
increased by the capital gain and if this were distributed in its entirety
the net effect would be to tax the shareholders on the gain at ordinary
income rates. In the above example (assuming a gain of $25,500 which
is distributed), the shareholders would receive taxable dividends of
$25,500 in addition to the $30,000 of interest. This result would not
obtain, however, if the gains could be eliminated using losses.
Other possibilities are mentioned in section VII, infra, but none of
them permits the same degree of flexibility as individual ownership of
the portfolio as does the use of property distributions. This fact must be
weighed by the planner in light of the circumstances of the particular
situation in determining which method will be used to avoid the necessity
of recognizing capital gains at the corporate level.
4. DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS AND PROFITS
43
Another possible use of property distributions is to distribute current
earnings and profits. Since the stockholder-distributee would get a
stepped up basis44 and if capital gains at the corporate level upon distri-
bution can be avoided 45 the immediate effect of this would be to avoid
recognition of any capital gain. In addition, the undistributed personal
holding company income would be reduced by the full fair market value
of the property distributed, so that the personal holding company prob-
42. The amount of the excess deductions is computed as follows:
Dividend Income $ 30,000
Dividends Received Deduction
(85% of Dividend Income) (25,500)
Interest Expense (30,000)
EXCESS OF DEDUCTIONS OVER INCOME $(25,500)
43. What are earnings and profits? No definition appears in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 or the regulations thereunder. Their basic effect under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 316(a) is to provide a ceiling for taxability of distributions from corporations to share-
holders. Under that provision of the law, current and accumulated earnings and profits must
be segregated in order to make the determination of whether a distribution is a taxable
dividend.
Most computations of earnings and profits begin with taxable income and add artificial
deductions such as the dividends received deduction, tax exempt income items, etc.; and
subtract non-deductible expenses such as income taxes paid, etc.
For a full discussion of earnings and profits, see BirxER & EuSTICE, supra note 2, 1 7.03;
articles cited at note 30 supra.
44. I Tr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301(d).
45. See section VII infra.
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lems will be eliminated by such distributions." However, the earnings
and profits of the corporation are only reduced to the extent of the
basis of the distributed property."7 For this reason, the gain inherent
in such property will merely be deferred, and, assuming that the re-
maining earnings and profits are later distributed to the shareholders,
the gain will be recognized in the form of dividend income to the share-
holders. In addition, the earnings and profits are not minimized when
current earnings and profits are distributed in this manner. Thus, it would
seem that paying dividends in kind to distribute current earnings is
not desirable.
H. Liquidation of the Corporation
If, as recommended, the earnings and profits are kept low, the cor-
poration may, if desired, be effectively liquidated on an installment basis
over a period of several years by merely making a gradual distribution
of the assets of the corporation to the shareholders. As discussed above,
this would merely produce a tax-free recovery of basis or a capital gain
to the shareholder. Even if the earnings and profits are not kept low,
certain types of redemptions may be effected so that the stockholders
whose shares are being redeemed will have a capital gain and there will
be no tax consequences at the corporate level. 48
I. Use of Fringe Benefit Plans
In addition, the corporate form of operation may permit the use of
fringe benefit plans, such as qualified pension and profit sharing plans
and medical expense reimbursement plans, which can have highly ad-
vantageous tax consequences.49
III. QUALIFICATION OF THE TRANSFER UNDER § 351
A. General Implications of a § 351 Transaction
Internal Revenue Code § 351 provides in pertinent part that a trans-
fer of property by one or more persons to a corporation other than an
"investment company" will be tax-free if the transfer is solely in exchange
for stock or securities and the transferors are in control of the corporation
immediately after the transfer. If the assets to be transferred to the
corporation have market values in excess of their bases, it will be essential
to qualify the transfer under this section to avoid the recognition of
gain resulting from a taxable exchange."°
46. See section VI(A) (2) infra.
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(a) (3).
48. See section VIII infra, for a full discussion of liquidations and other methods of
removing property from the corporation.
49. See section IX infra, for a full discussion of the use of fringe benefit plans.
50. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 1001 provides the general rules for realization and recogni-
tion of such gain.
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As in most "tax-free" transactions, the tax effect of the transfer is
merely deferred by virtue of the provisions relating to the basis of the
property transferred. The basis of the stock or securities received by
the transferors in a qualifying transaction in which no gain or loss is
recognized is the same as that of the property transferred to the corpora-
tion,5 and the basis of the transferred property in the hands of the
corporation is the same as it was in the hands of the transferor.5 2
In determining the holding period for the stock and securities re-
ceived by the transferor and the property received by the corporation,
the transferor's holding period for the transferred assets may normally
be "tacked."5 To assure qualification of the transfer of the portfolio
under § 351, some of the requirements should be considered in detail.
B. The Transfer Must Be in Exchange for Stock or Securities
Since the preferred and common stock to be issued are clearly
"stock or securities" within the plain meaning of the statute, there is
no problem in qualifying the transaction under § 351 by virtue of the
issuance of these instruments. Some difficulty, however, may be encoun-
tered in determining whether the debt proposed to be issued14 may be
classified as securities.
Apparently the time to maturity has been the most important factor
in determining whether debt instruments are to be classified as securities.
For example, in one case, 55 ten year notes were declared securities, but
in another case, 50 two year notes were held not to be securities. After
surveying the cases on the issue, one esteemed writer has stated that
"[n]otes with a five-year term or less rarely seem able to qualify as
'securities', while a term of ten years or more ordinarily is sufficient to
bring them within the statute."5 Thus, it seems clear that the debt obli-
gations used in the plan should have at least a ten year term.
C. Continuity of Interest Doctrine
Although the term of the debt instrument is probably the key factor
in determining whether a security exists within the meaning of § 351,
it is clear that
the controlling consideration is an over-all evaluation of the
origin and nature of the debt, the degree of participation and
51. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 358(a) (1).
52. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 362(a).
53. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 1223(1) (as to the transferor), § 1223(2) (as to the
corporation).
54. See section fl(B) supra.
55. George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (1968).
56. Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588
(1941).
57. BITTKER & EuSTICE, supra note 2, ff 3.04 at 315.
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continuing interest in the business and the extent of the proprie-
tary interest (arising because of the issuance of an obligation),
the purpose of the advances, and other like considerations.,,
In Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner,"9 the notes in
question were payable within five to nine years, but soon after their
issuance they were subordinated to large bank loans so that the " 'note-
holders were assuming a substantial risk of [the taxpayer's] enterprise
.. ) 6O Accordingly, the court found that the notes constituted securities
within the meaning of § 112(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 (the forerunner of § 351)."'
The facts of the cases discussed in the text and footnotes above
do not apply directly to the instant situation, but the "overall evaluation"
test may raise questions as to the applicability of the "continuity of
interest" doctrine. This doctrine has been developed largely in connection
with the reorganization provisions62 and requires the transferor to retain
"a substantial stake in the enterprise."6 If applicable, a transaction
would not qualify under § 351 unless the transferor retained a continu-
ing interest in the enterprise transferred to the corporation.
It is not clear whether the scope of the doctrine is broad enough to
encompass § 351, but the language of some cases, although arguably
dicta, is strong enough to require the prudent planner of a § 351 trans-
action to take into account the possibility of its application. For example,
one decision stated:
We see no justification for supposing that the word "securities"
had different meanings when used in the reorganization sub-
divisions and in those relating to transfers. Continuity of inter-
est if required to satisfy the term as used in subdivisions
112(b) (3) and (4) [the reorganization provisions] ought to
be required for 112 (b)(5) [the forerunner of § 351].4
Under the plan in the instant situation, it seems clear that the
doctrine would be satisfied. Where the transferor received only cash
and short term notes, there was no continuity of interest," but where
cash plus an entire issue of preferred stock was received, the owner of
58. Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 555, 557 n.2 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956) (emphasis deleted) (quoting the taxpayer's brief and
approving of the test set forth therein).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 560, quoting Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737 (1954).
61. Similarly, in two other cases, Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116
(Sth Cir. 1959) and Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955), it
was determined that debt instruments in thinly capitalized corporations were securities on
the basis that the holders of such obligations had assumed some of the risks of the enterprise.
62. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368.
63. See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
64. Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
588 (1941).
65. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
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such stock, although non-voting, was held to have acquired a substantial
interest in the affairs of the corporation and therefore the doctrine was
satisfied. 6
Since this plan contemplates the issuance of debt and voting pre-
ferred stock to the owner-transferor, there would clearly be sufficient con-
tinuity of interest to qualify under § 351. However, care should be
taken if the basic scheme is modified in such a way that any transferor
receives only debt securities because, in applying the doctrine, the terms
of the obligations are not material, and the transfer by him in these
circumstances may constitute a taxable exchange for lack of a continuity
of interest. 7
D. The Control Requirement
In order for a transaction to come within the ambit of § 351, the
transferors must collectively "control" the corporation immediately
after the transfer. Reference is made in § 351 to § 368(c) for the
definition of control. That provision requires ownership of at least 80%
of the total voting power and 80% of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock.
It is clear that the government construes that section as making
ownership by the transferors of at least 80% of the total number of
shares of each class of stock mandatory. 68 Thus, if the transaction is
structured so that the owner-transferor's children, for example, receive
all of the non-voting common stock and do not transfer any property to
the corporation, § 351 will not apply.
Several solutions are possible here. The persons receiving the com-
mon stock could become transferors by contributing some of their own
property to the corporation in exchange for the stock. Making the com-
mon stockholders transferors may also have other advantages in con-
nection with the possible application of § 2036(a) and § 2038.69
66. John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
67. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420 (1940).
68. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 CUM. BUL. 115.
69. See section XI infra. Since the amount to be transferred by the common stock-
holders may be relatively small it should be noted that the de minimus rule stated in Treas.
Reg. § 1.351-1(a) (1) (ii) (1967), disqualifying as transferors persons who transfer relatively
small amounts of property to the corporation, does not pose any problems in this situation
since it only applies where the transferor already owns stock or securities in the transferee
corporation, or where he is receiving the stock or securities partially in exchange for services
rendered by him to the corporation.
Another approach would be to have the owner-transferor take all of the stock in ex-
change for his property and subsequently transfer the common stock to his children. This
procedure may, however, present a problem with the requirement under § 351 that the
transferors must control the corporation immediately after the transfer. See section III(E)
infra.
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E. The "Immediately After" Requirement
In a commercial setting, there are decisions and rulings holding that
mere momentary control is not sufficient for qualification under § 351.10
Two leading cases in this area7 have involved situations where the stock,
soon after issuance, was to be resold to the public.
The basic test set out in these cases is that if the initial issuance and
subsequent disposal are so interdependent that one would be fruitless
without the other, the immediately after requirement is not satisfied.72
But where the initial issuance has a significant purpose unrelated to the
subsequent disposition, the transaction may qualify.
78
If this test were applied to the plan, the owner-transferor taking all
the stock and then transferring it to his children, it would be a close
question as to whether the transaction could qualify. Although a strong
argument could probably be made in favor of qualification, the uncer-
tainty of the situation is anything but ideal-particularly at the planning
stage. Of course, the taxpayer's position could probably be strengthened
if the owner-transferor held all the stock for a substantial period before
transferring it, but in the interval the value of the common stock may
increase causing adverse gift tax consequences or making a transfer for
adequate consideration infeasible.
Although a noncommercial setting has not been expressly distin-
guished by the courts, at least one case may present some authority for
a valid distinction.74 Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner75 stated in
effect that although the transferor had made up his mind to give away
some of the stock after the transfer, he was under no obligation to do so.
For that reason, the court found that the transferor did in fact have
control immediately after the exchange.
Certainly a cogent argument can be made for applying the Wilgard
case to the plan being analyzed here. The case could probably even be
squared with the rationale of the Manhattan Building Co.7 and American
Bantam Car Co. 77 cases. However, it might also be asserted, particularly
in light of the early date of the decision, that the Wilgard decision is
similar to the early cases7" which, in light of later decisions, 79 are no
70. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 Cum. BULL. 73.
71. Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957), acquiesced in 1957-2 Cumy. BULL. 5;
American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
72. Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957), acquiesced in 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
73. American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
74. Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
655 (1942) [hereinafter referred to as Wilgard].
75. Id.
76. 27 T.C. 1032 (1957).
77. 11 T.C. 397 (1948).
78. See, e.g., Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940).
79. See notes 71-78 supra, and accompanying text.
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longer considered good law."' This fact may cause the cautious planner
to use one of the other techniques suggested above to satisfy the control
requirement.
F. Value of Stock or Securities Received by the Transferors
The value of the stock or securities received by each transferor need
not be equivalent to the property transferred by him to the corporation
in order to qualify under § 351.81 However, where such values are not
equivalent, a gift may be deemed to have been made82 to the extent of
the disparity between the values. The application of this rule to the plan
seems obvious. Accordingly, the planning of the transaction should take
into account the possible gift tax consequences which may result.83
G. Transfer to an "Investment Company"
Section 351 does not apply to transfers to "investment companies"
after June 30, 1967.84 A transfer to an investment company is deemed
to have occurred where diversification in the transferor's interests results
directly or indirectly and 80% of the value of all the transferee corpora-
tion's assets other than cash and non-convertible debt are held for invest-
ment and are readily marketable stocks or securities (i.e., traded on an
exchange or quoted regularly in an over the counter market), or interests
in regulated investment companies or real estate investment trusts.8 5
The transferee corporation under this plan would almost certainly
satisfy the second requirement, but through careful planning the diversi-
fication requirement may be avoided. The regulations8" state that di-
versification occurs where two or more persons transfer nonidentical
assets to the corporation. However, if there are one or more transfers of
nonidentical assets which, when aggregated, constitute an insignificant
portion of the value of all assets transferred, they will be disregarded in
determining whether diversification occurred. The examples in the
regulations8 7 set outside limits on the definition of an insignificant
portion by illustrating that approximately 1 percent comes within the
definition, but 50 percent does not. It would certainly seem that 3 percent
to 4 percent would still be considered insignificant. Thus, if the eventual
common stockholders actually transfer property to the corporation, its
80. But see BIrTKa & EUSTiCE, supra note 2, 3.10 at 3-37.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b) (1) (1955).
82. Id.; INT. REv CODE OF 1954, § 351(e) (3).
83. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501 et seq. The valuation problems relating to such
a gift are discussed at section X infra.
84. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1) (1967).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c) (1967).
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5) (1967).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(6) (1967).
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aggregate value should be low enough to stay safely within the insignifi-
cant portion rule.
The diversification problem could also be avoided by having the
common shareholders transfer assets identical to those transferred by
the owner-transferor. This would seem to require that owner-transferor
and the common stockholders transfer exactly the same stocks and bonds
in the same proportions. Although this may involve some practical dif-
ficulty, if it is done there will be no risk of diversification.
Another possible means of avoiding the investment company prob-
lem is to have the owner-transferor take all the stock and securities and
then have him transfer the common stock to the intended holders. The
regulations, although they are somewhat ambiguous, seem to pre-empt
the use of this type of scheme by stating: "If a transfer is part of a plan
to achieve diversification without recognition of gain, ... the original
transfer will be treated as resulting in diversification." '88 In addition, this
type of structuring for the transaction may present problems in relation
to the immediately after requirement.89
It should be emphasized that if large amounts of appreciated securi-
ties are transferred to the corporation, great care must be taken to pre-
vent the occurrence of diversification, since, if present, the entire trans-
action will fail to qualify under § 351 and gain or loss will be recognized
on the transfer by all parties.
H. Basis after Qualifying the § 351 Transfer and
Possible Planning Devices Related Thereto
As stated previously, 0 the basis for the stock and securities received
by the shareholders in a qualifying exchange is the same as the aggregate
basis of the property transferred to the corporation,9' and the basis of
the transferred property in the hands of the corporation is the same as
it was in the transferor's hands.9 2 Under the regulations,93 the basis of
the stock and securities received in the exchange must be allocated in
proportion to their various fair market values.
Since the owner-transferor will be contributing most of the corporate
assets, the stock and securities he receives will have the greatest fair
market value and therefore the highest basis. The importance of this
fact is that, to the extent of the basis of the stock received, a shareholder
may remove appreciated assets from the corporation tax-free (assuming
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(5) (1967).
89. See section III(D) supra.
90. Section III(A) supra.
91. INT. REV. CoDE op 1954, § 358.
92. INT. REv. COaE or 1954, § 361.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(b)(2) (1955).
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
earnings and profits have been used up)9 4 and receive a stepped-up basis
(i.e., equal to fair market value) for them at that time.9"
There are several advantages which may result from receipt of a
higher basis equalling fair market value. The property may be sold by
the distributee after the distribution and the gain will be lower since
the amount realized will be closer to the basis of the property sold.9"
Although the basis of the remaining stock held is reduced to the extent of
the distribution 7 any capital gains on sales of corporate assets are de-
ferred until the basis of the stock is used up. In addition, since the
owner-transferor will probably be the first of the shareholders to die,
the gain potential in his stock may be completely eliminated if he still
holds it at death because it will receive a stepped-up basis at that time.98
In this way, gain recognition may be partially eliminated.9
Furthermore, the total tax basis of the family unit could be maxi-
mized if the owner-transferor made lifetime gifts of stock (with minimal
gift tax cost) thus distributed to him. For example, assume that the
stock of the owner-transferor has a basis of $100,000 and a fair market
value of $1,000,000. Assume further that $100,000 worth of corporate
assets are distributed to him as a dividend at a time when there are no
earnings and profits (current or accumulated). The assets distributed
are then given away,100 and the donees receive a substituted basis of
$100,000.10' The owner-transferor then dies when his stock is worth
$1,000,000 which has a basis of zero. That stock receives a basis under
§ 1014(a) of $1,000,000 and the donees have had the benefit of an
additional $100,000 of basis at minimal tax cost.10 2
It should be noted that if securities which have depreciated are
distributed in the manner described above, the effect will be to defer tax
94. See section II(F) supra.
95. See section VI(B) infra.
96. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1001; but see section VII infra, for a discussion of the
possibility that gain may be recognized to the distributing corporation as a result of such a
distribution if it is closely followed by a sale or exchange of the distributed property.
97. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(c)(2).
98. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 1014(a).
99. But, see section VII infra, in relation to the problems which arise as a result of sales
or exchanges of distributed property.
100. It is assumed that the gift thus made is not in contemplation of death under the
terms of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035.
101. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 1015. It should be noted that the gift tax paid in connec-
tion with the transfer is also added to basis, but the total basis in the hands of the donee may
not exceed the fair market value of the subject property at the time the gift is made. With
this latter rule in mind, the gift should be planned in such a way as to maximize the basis
increase resulting from the gift tax paid.
102. The statement regarding minimal gift tax cost assumes that the owner-transferor
is married and therefore able to use the gift splitting provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2513, and that neither the owner-transferor nor his spouse has used any part of the specific
exemption provided for in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2521.
This will permit the owner-transferor to make nontaxable gifts of $60,000 plus additional
gifts up to $6,000 per donee. INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 2503. Nevertheless, a small gift tax
may result if a gift of $100,000 is made.
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losses which is certainly not desirable. The maximization of basis, how-
ever, could be accomplished with such assets.
IV. USE OF DEBT CAPITALIZATION
A. Benefits to be Derived from the Use of Debt
As stated previously, the corporation would be capitalized through a
combination of debt which would qualify as securities within the meaning
of § 3 51, preferred stock and common stock. The use of debt capitalization
deserves special attention. Before discussing the means of preventing
instruments which are nominally debt from being classed as equity for
tax purposes, some of the economic and tax ramifications of the debt
versus equity question should be considered in light of the particular
circumstances of the instant situation.
One effect of the debt is that the interest payable thereon is deduct-
ible under § 162 or § 212. This fact will operate to mitigate or elimi-
nate"' the double taxation effect,1°4 whereas dividends paid on equity
instruments are nondeductible and tend to produce double taxation.
However, the securities transferred to the corporation are likely
to have a low cash yield as common stocks in public companies frequently
do, and if the amount of the debt and the interest rate thereon are too
high, there may not be sufficient cash in the form of dividend and interest
income to fund the interest obligation. Even more importantly, a high
interest rate on a large amount of debt securities may operate in com-
bination with the dividends from the preferred stock to give the owner-
transferor a disproportionate amount of taxable income.
If the interest paid on the debt were more than the total income
of the corporation, there could be an actual increase in aggregate income
of the corporation and the shareholders. The planner of the transaction
should consider this possibility, and carefully attempt to avoid this effect
by determining the interest rate and the amount of debt to be issued
accordingly. In addition, it should be noted that distribution of property
in satisfaction of an interest obligation is a taxable transaction,105 while
no gain or loss is recognized on distributions of property with respect
to stock.106
There are other frequently cited advantages of using debt as opposed
to equity such as removal of corporate assets through debt repayment
103. See section VI(C) infra.
104. Section II(E) supra.
105. In light of cases such as Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941) and Electro-
Chemical Engraving Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 513 (1941), this type of transaction would
certainly seem to constitute a sale or other disposition as contemplated by INT. Rrv. CODE OF
1954, 6 1001. See section VII(A), infra, and cases cited therein for a somewhat analogous
situation.
106. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 311. See section VII infra, and note the effect on earnings
and profits discussed in section II(G) (4) supra, and section VI(A) infra.
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which produces no income to the creditor,"0 7 but this may also be ac-
complished in the instant case by distributions with respect to stock
since earnings and profits are to be kept low. Similarly, the other ad-
vantages have limited or no application here. The deductibility of the
interest, however, is a considerable benefit and may prove to be an
essential element for the success of the plan since it may be used to
mitigate or eliminate the double taxation effect. 10 8
B. Problems in Having the Instruments Classed as Debt
Given the advantage of using some debt capitalization in this situa-
tion, there are certain problems which may be encountered in having it
treated as such for tax purposes. Frequently, the Internal Revenue
Service will attempt to have the alleged debt treated as equity if that is
its true nature. 0 9
The issue of whether the instrument is debt or equity is a question
of fact, and for that reason no simple test may be relied upon in making
the determination. One case, 10 stated:
[I]n the final analysis each case must rest and be decided upon
its own unique factual flavor, dissimilar from all others, for the
intention to create a debt is a compound of many diverse ex-
ternal elements pointing in the end to what is essentially a sub-
jective conclusion."'
This type of approach is necessarily perplexing to the planner, but an
analysis of the numerous cases on the subject shows that a number of
factors have been considered."' Some of them will be considered in the
discussion that follows.
1. PROPORTIONAL HOLDINGS OF DEBT AND STOCK
Where the same persons hold debt and stock in similar proportions,
the courts will scrutinize the debt capitalization carefully."' Particularly
relevant here is the fact that technical disproportion may be disregarded
in cases where the family as a unit has proportional holdings." 4 But
the Court of Claims in Liflans Corp. v. United States" 5 stated:
107. Satisfaction of debt with property, however, will constitute a taxable event. See
note 105 supra, and cases cited therein.
108. See section VI(C) inira.
109. See, e.g., Jack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
110. American Processing and Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
111. Id. at 848.
112. One writer sets out 24 different criteria which have been considered by various
courts in determining whether certain capitalization was debt or equity. 4A J. MERTENS, Ja.,
LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 26.10(c), at 72-80 (1967).
113. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
114. Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also P.M. Finance
Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1962); Wilbur Security Co. v. Commissioner,
279 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1960).
115. 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. C1. 1968).
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[T]his factor alone is not controlling, and must be weighed
against all the factors in the case .... It is true, as defendant
contends, that proportionality has been an important factor in
many cases holding that instruments denominated debt actually
represented equity. But in those cases . . . many other factors
also militated against a debt characterization.""
2. THIN CAPITALIZATION
Where the corporate capital structure has a high proportion of debt
as compared to equity, the courts may take this into account as an
indication that holders of the debt are taking risks similar to those taken
by the shareholders. However, all circumstances must be considered
to determine what ratio is excessive, and in the final analysis the debt
to equity ratio is only one factor to be considered." 7 One writer has
suggested that if the ratio is less than 3:1 that the corporation will not
be regarded as thinly capitalized."' It should also be noted that in
computing the ratio, fair market values of assets, including goodwill, are
used." 9
3. SUBORDINATION OF DEBT
Where the debt held by a shareholder is subordinated to other cor-
porate obligations it may be considered similar in terms of risk, etc.
to equity, 2 ° but again this may be outweighed by other factors.
4. OTHER FACTORS
Following are several other factors which should be considered in
planning the transaction:
(1) Intent of the parties as reflected by the surrounding facts and
circumstances including the terms of the instrument. 2 '
(2) Substantial economic reality of the transaction. This includes
such considerations as whether a loan on similar terms could be obtained
from an outside lender. 22
(3) Section 385, recently added to the income tax law, also sets
out several factors to be considered, and authorizes the Treasury Depart-
116. Id. at 971, referring to Affiliated Research, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 646 (Ct.
Cl. 1965) (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Gloucester Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 183 (1st
Cir. 1962); Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
118. BITTKER & EusTIcE, supra note 2, ff 4.04 at 4-13.
119. Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
120. See, e.g., Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968) ; Jack Daniel
Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
121. American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 848 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
122. American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 848 (Ct. CL. 1967);
IUflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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ment to promulgate regulations to effectuate that provision. The statute
is very general and no regulations have been proposed at the time of this
writing.
C. Recommendations Relating to Debt Capital in This Plan
As already discussed, there are no sure answers in this area, but the
careful planner will attempt to get as many as possible of the foregoing
factors working in his favor, both at the inception of the plan and during
its operation, through proper draftsmanship and continuing advice to
his client. If the family solidarity rule 2s applies, it would probably not
be possible in this plan to achieve anything other than "technical
disproportion" between stock and debt holdings. However, the other
factors could be satisfied by having a low debt to equity ratio, using
all the formalities and terms that would be required by parties dealing
on an arms-length basis, attempting to avoid subordination, and having
the corporation make principal and interest payments strictly in ac-
cordance with the terms of the instrument.
V. PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY PROVISIONs-BASIC CODE
STRUCTURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO AN INCORPORATED PORTFOLIO
Section 542 defines a personal holding company as a corporation,
60 percent of whose adjusted ordinary gross income124 is personal holding
company income, 125 and more than 50 percent of the stock of which was
owned at any time during the last half of the taxable year by 5 or fewer
individuals.
The disadvantage of being classed as a personal holding company is
that, in addition to any income taxes, a personal holding company tax of
70 percent of the "undistributed personal holding company income" is
imposed on the corporation. 20 In effect, these sections require a personal
holding company to distribute all its personal holding company income
to its shareholders as dividends in order to avoid the imposition of the
prohibitive tax discussed above. More technically, the base for the
personal holding company tax (undistributed personal holding company
income) is reduced by a "dividends paid deduction."'127
It is certain that an incorporated portfolio as contemplated in this
plan would be a personal holding company since all of its adjusted
ordinary gross income would normally be interest and dividends which
are classified as personal holding company income by § 543 (a) (1), and
because it would be highly improbable, taking into account the attribution
123. Section IV(B)(1) supra.
124. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 543(b) (2).
125. INT. REV. CODE O 1954, § 543.
126. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 541. Undistributed personal holding company income is
defined in INT. REV. CODE o 1954, § 545.
127. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 561 et seq.
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rules of § 544, that the stock ownership test of § 543 (a) (2) would not
be satisfied. In order to prevent that test from applying there must
be at least 10 unrelated shareholders. That would be most unlikely under
this plan.
Since the corporation will be a personal holding company, dividends
must be paid to the extent necessary to eliminate all undistributed per-
sonal holding company income.28 In somewhat simplified form, the
amount of the required distribution would be computed as follows:
Taxable Income
Less: Income Taxes
Long Term Capital Gain over Short Term Capital Loss
Net of Income Tax related thereto
Add: § 243 Dividends Received Deduction12"
It should be noted, as suggested by the foregoing formula, that the penalty
tax is not imposed on long term gains from securities sales,' 1° but, as
recommended previously,' 81 realization of such gains should be avoided
at the corporate level.
Two additional rules should be mentioned. First, the accumulated
earnings tax'31 does not apply to a personal holding company,13 3 and
therefore no problems with that tax will be encountered in this situation.
Second, to the extent of undistributed personal holding company income
(determined without reduction for distributions) distributions are deemed
taxable dividends even though earnings and profits are less than this
amount.' This provision should have little or no effect in the instant
situation since earnings and profits will, as a practical matter, be equal
to or greater than the undistributed personal holding company income as
adjusted. 8
VI. VARIOUS TAX EFFECTS OF THE PRACTICAL NECESSITY
OF DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE EARNINGS EACH YEAR
TO Avom THE PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY TAX
A. At the Corporate Level
1. PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS IN CASH
Since the Code does not permit a corporation to deduct cash divi-
dends for income tax purposes there would be no income tax effect at
the corporate level from paying cash dividends. However, corporate
128. IxT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 561 et seq.
129. See INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 545.
130. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 545(b) (5).
131. Section II(F) supra.
132. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531 et seq.
133. INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 532(b) (1).
134. INT. REv. CODE 01 1954, § 316(b).
135. See the discussion of earnings and profits in section II(G) (4) supra.
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earnings and profits would be reduced by the amount of the distribu-
tion.136
2. PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS IN KIND
The same rules regarding deductibility would apply as with cash
dividends, but various other questions arise:
(1) Will recognition of gain or loss result from the distribution? 8 "
(2) What is the effect of property distributions on earnings and
profits? 118
(3) What is the effect of a property distribution on the undistributed
personal holding company income?8 9
As discussed above, reduction of the undistributed personal holding
company income to zero is necessary to avoid the personal holding com-
pany tax. The amount of the dividends paid deduction is determined by
§ 561 and § 562. Among other things, the deduction includes dividends
paid during the year. Section 316, referred to in § 561 and § 562, defines
a dividend as a distribution of property by a corporation to its share-
holders, but one limited to the current and accumulated earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation, and, in the case of a personal
holding company, to the extent of the undistributed personal holding
company income if greater than the current and accumulated earnings and
profits. In addition, § 316(a) defines distribution by reference to § 301.
Section 301 (b) (1) (A) states that the amount of a distribution includes
the fair market value of any property received by the shareholder (as-
suming it otherwise comes within the definition of a distribution).
Under this analysis, it would seem that the dividends paid deduction
under § 561 and § 562 would include any dividends in kind paid during
the taxable year to the extent of the fair market value of such property
distributions. There is a recent case which so held through the use of
similar reasoning. 4 °
B. At the Shareholder Level
As stated previously,' 4 ' a distribution with respect to corporate stock
as defined in § 301 is taxed to the distributee-shareholder as a dividend
136. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312 (a)(1).
137. See section VII infra.
138. See section II(G) (4) supra.
139. See section V infra, for a basic discussion of the personal holding company provisions
including undistributed personal holding company income.
140. H. Wetter Mfg. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1972). See also 2
RABxIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND ESTATE TAXATION § 17.11(3) (1971) (agree-
ing that the dividends paid deduction is measured by the amount of the "dividend" to the
shareholder). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.562-1(a) (1958) stating that the amount of the deduc-
tion for dividends paid in the case of a property distribution is the basis of the property
distributed. This appears contrary to the statutory language discussed in the text, but an
analogy to INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, § 312(a)(3) might be argued in favor of the validity of
the regulation.
141. Section II(G)(3) supra.
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pursuant to § 301 (c) (1) to the extent of the shareholder's pro rata share
of corporate earnings and profits, and, if a personal holding company, to
the extent that undistributed personal holding company income (not
reduced by distributions to which § 316(b) applies) exceeds corporate
earnings and profits.'
To the extent the distribution is not a dividend, it is first deemed
a tax-free return of the cost basis in the stock to the extent of such basis,
and any excess is deemed a gain on the sale or exchange of the stock.
143
Where there is a distribution in kind, an individual shareholder-
distributee's basis for the distributed property is fair market value.
4
C. Taxation of the Recurring Income Produced by the Portfolio
Taxation of income from the portfolio at the corporate level is
substantially sheltered by the dividends received deduction allowed by
§ 243(a). This deduction amounts to 85% of the dividends received
from domestic corporations. Thus, only 15% of such dividends are sub-
ject to the corporate income tax. However, the deduction is limited by
§ 246(b)(1) to 85% of the corporate taxable income before the § 243
deduction, unless the corporation has a net operating loss as defined in
§ 172.'45
If the portfolio were managed with these rules in mind, highly
favorable tax treatment could result. Assuming the corporation can be
capitalized with substantial debt,40 there would be a considerable de-
ductible interest expense to be paid each year. Also, assuming that the
bulk of the portfolio consisted of stocks whose dividends would qualify
for the 85%o deduction (which is likely),' a net operating loss would
probably result in any year in which there were no extraordinary items
such as capital gains. 48 If there were such a loss, there would be no tax
payable at the corporate level, thereby completely eliminating the double
taxation effect.
VII. POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR Loss AT THE CORPORATE
LEVEL AS A RESULT OF PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS
The general rule that no gain or loss is recognized by a corporation
on a distribution of property with respect to its stock is clearly set out
in § 311, and none of the exceptions stated therein would apply in this
case. There are, however, several situations where the corporation may
be required to recognize gain despite § 311.
142. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316.
143. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 301(c) (2), (3).
144. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301(d).
145. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 246(b) (2).
146. See section IV supra.
147. See section II(D) supra.
148. xTr REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172(d) (6) shows that the 85% deduction is allowable in
computing the net operating loss.
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A. Satisfaction of a Pre-Existing Obligation to Pay a Dividend
First, the resolution declaring the dividend should initially be
framed in terms of a property distribution in order to avoid any possible
argument that a pre-existing debt of a specific monetary amount is being
satisfied by a distribution of appreciated property. Such satisfaction could
possibly precipitate a gain to the corporation on the distribution despite
§ 311 (a). 149
B. Assignment of Income Doctrine
Another possible problem arises as a result of the committee report
relating to § 311(a) which stated that the enactment of that section was
not intended to change existing law which operates to attribute share-
holders' income to their corporation.5 0 The report, as an example,
cites Commissioner v. First State Bank15 1 in which certain notes which
had previously been written off as bad debts were distributed to the
shareholders at a time when they were considered at least partially
collectible. The court held that the collections by the shareholders
should be considered taxable to the corporation since there was an antici-
patory assignment of income.
It is clear that the decision in that case was based purely on assign-
ment of income principles in that the note, because it was previously
written off, lost its status as a capital asset and became purely potential
income. It is clear that such income must be taxed to the assignor, as
in the landmark case of Helvering v. Horst,52 where it was held that
interest collected on a bond coupon which had been detached from the
bond and assigned to another was includible in the income of the owner
of the bond.
The court was careful to distinguish cases like General Utilities and
Operating Co. v. Helvering 53 in which a note not previously written off
was distributed. It stated that in the General Utilities case, "the fruit
was on the tree" but in the instant case "the tree itself represents fruit of
prior years that was not taxed" and further found that "[t] he distinction
is the same as would have existed ... if the father [in Horst] had given
his son the bond with the unearned-interest coupon attached."'' 54 Thus,
it seems clear that the assignment of income doctrine cannot apply in
this or any other context if the capital asset itself is transferred at a
time when there is no inherent income already accrued. For this reason,
149. Bacon-McMillan Veneer Co., 20 B.T.A. 556 (1930).
150. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 246 (1954).
151. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948) [hereinafter referred to
as First State Bank].
152. 311 U.S. '112 (1940).
153. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
154. Commissioner v. First State Bank, 168 F.2d 1004, 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 867 (1948).
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where there is a transfer of an asset which contains unrealized apprecia-
tion, the gain potential inherent in it may not be considered income to the
transferor under the assignment of income doctrine since both the fruit
and tree have been disposed of. 15
Under this analysis, the distribution in kind of appreciated stocks or
securities held by the corporation could not precipitate a gain to the
corporation under the assignment of income doctrine as set forth in the
First State Bank case referred to in the committee report. Because the
report cites this case, a cogent argument could certainly be made that the
statement in the committee report is limited to attribution of shareholders'
income to their corporation based on assignment of income principles.
If such an argument prevailed, the distribution of appreciated assets
could be made with no danger of gain recognition at the corporate level.
C. Attribution of Shareholder Sales to the Corporation Where There
Is a Tax Avoidance Motive or the Sale Was in Reality Made by the
Corporation
There is another line of cases, however, which may have been
preserved by the committee report. Commissioner v. Court Holding
Co."'6 involved a corporation about to undergo complete liquidation.
Negotiations had been conducted for the sale of all corporate assets
and the deal was about to be consummated when it was discovered that
a sale by the corporation would precipitate a capital gain at the cor-
porate level. For this reason, it was decided that the corporation should
be liquidated in order to have the shareholders sell the assets on the same
terms as had been previously negotiated by the corporation. The court
held that under these circumstances, the corporation must recognize the
gain.
Five years later, the Supreme Court limited the Court Holding Co.
decision in United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.",7 There the
corporation and its shareholders were involved in negotiations to sell
the corporate operations. The taxpayer refused from the inception of
the dealings with the purchaser to allow the corporation to sell the assets
because it would produce unfavorable tax consequences in the nature of
a gain at the corporate level. As a result, the corporation was liquidated
and the shareholders made the sale. The court found that the sale was in
fact made by the shareholders and that this case was distinguishable from
Court Holding Co. since the negotiations by the corporation to sell the
assets directly were avoided from the inception, and not called off at
the last minute. The court expressly stated that the finding by the trial
155. See Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954) holding to this effect with
respect to calves which were inventory items of considerable value and had no cost basis at
the time of transfer.
156. 324 U.S. 331 (1945) [hereinafter referred to as Court Holding Co.].
157. 338 U.S. 451 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Cumberland].
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court that tax avoidance was a major motive for structuring the trans-
action in this manner was not material.
If the holding of Cumberland applied in the instant situation, it
would be simple to avoid any gain at the corporate level since there is no
negotiation involved in selling relatively small amounts of publicly traded
securities. They could merely be distributed to the shareholders who
would, in turn, sell them through their brokers. However, that decision
and its statement that tax avoidance motive is immaterial may be limited
to liquidating distributions, 158 particularly in light of the language of the
opinion stating that "[t]he corporate tax is thus aimed primarily at the
profits of a going concern."15
9
In Commissioner v. Transport Trading and Terminal Corp., °60 in-
volving a non-liquidating distribution in kind, the court stated, in effect,
that its holding that the gain on the sale must be recognized at the cor-
porate level could be based merely on the fact that the distribution
served no non-tax purpose. Despite this broad language, it was unneces-
sary to go so far in this case since there were substantial negotiations
regarding the sale conducted at the corporate level as there were in the
Court Holding Co. case. Another case, United States v. Lynch,'6' relying
heavily on Transport Trading, held that the gain must be reported at
the, corporate level where inventory distributed to shareholders was
subsequently sold utilizing the corporate selling facilities. Although its
decision did not rest on this fact, the court here also stated that "[d] istri-
bution of corporate inventory with the expectation of immediate sale by
the shareholders pointedly suggests a transaction outside the range of
commercially-motivated and justifiable activity. .... "I
The foregoing cases may, of course, be distinguished from the plan
proposed here in that under this plan there will be no use of corporate
sales facilities, no distribution of inventory, and no pre-distribution
negotiations by the corporation. Nevertheless, the Tax Court in a more
recent case'63 termed these very distinctions "tenuous" where a motive
to avoid the corporate income tax was present. In addition, the court
expressly held that in light of the committee report mentioned above,
§ 311 (a) did not prevent recognition of gain at the corporate level, and
that the failure of the report to mention the Lynch case by name does
not preclude its application.
Despite the court's hostility toward the tax avoidance motive, the
158. Congress has enacted § 337 which allows a corporation to sell its assets and then
liquidate the proceeds without recognition of gain on the sales at the corporate level if
certain requirements are met. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 337.
159. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Service Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455 (1950).
160. 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950) [hereinafter referred
to as Transport Trading].
161. 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952) [hereinafter referred
to as Lynch].
162. Id. at 720.
163. A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc., 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
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decision seemed to rest mainly on the fact that there was a use of cor-
porate sales facilities to market the distributed inventory in the ordinary
course of business. Thus, in the instant plan, the foregoing distinctions
could presumably hold up even if a tax avoidance motive exists. This
approach is supported by a recent Fifth Circuit decision, Hines v. United
States, which expressly adopted these very distinctions and held that
"the sine qua non of the imputed income rule is a finding that the cor-
poration actively participated in the transaction that produced the income
to be imputed.""' 4 In so holding, the court found immaterial the facts
that the distribution was made by a going concern in anticipation of a
sale by the shareholders and that there was no valid business purpose for
the distribution aside from tax avoidance.
There is another recent case which may be construed to de-emphasize
the existence of the motive to avoid taxes. 65 There the court recog-
nized what seemed to be a rather flimsy business purpose and deemed
it "primary" although the transaction resulted in a substantial tax savings.
Although the treatment of distributions in kind may still be some-
what uncertain, unless a business or other non-tax purpose for the dis-
tribution can be developed or there is no sale or exchange of the distrib-
uted property shortly after the occurrence of the distribution, the Hines
case seems to go a long way toward eliminating these problems. Never-
theless, a conservative planner may wish to have the corporation make
regular property distributions in excess of current earnings for the
purpose of defraying some of the living expenses of the shareholder
in order to help negate the appearance of a tax avoidance motive. The
particular circumstances of the parties involved should be examined for
other nontax purposes for making property distributions.
Also, if there is no sale of the distributed assets soon after the
distribution, the risk of corporate capital gain may be further reduced.
The interval required is not certain, but it certainly would be difficult
to attribute the gain to the corporation if the interval were one or two
years. Authority for this proposition may be found in the tax court's
statement in A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc. 6' that the absence of a consensus or
understanding between the corporation and shareholders "that the assets
distributed would be sold immediately upon distribution" is indicative
that there should be no gain attributed to the corporation.' 61 Additionally,
in Dynamics Corporation of America v. United States1 8 the court was
persuaded not to attribute gain to the corporation by the fact that the
sale did not occur until nine months after the distribution. The inability
to sell right away with minimal tax cost may remove some advantages of
164. 477 F.2d 1063, 1069 (5th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Hines].
165. Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 449 F.2d 402 (Ct. C1. 1971).
166. 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
167. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
168. 449 F.2d 402 (CL CL 1971).
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the plan, 6 9 but some degree of flexibility is still retained while capital
gain taxes are kept low.
Prior to the decision in the Hines case, the risks in this area might
have caused the conservative advisor not to use the plan, since it could
have been too costly in terms of capital gain taxes to make adjustments
in the corporate portfolio. Despite these facts, past history may have
shown that there were few sales and the client might not have contem-
plated numerous future sales, or other circumstances may have reflected
that, even if some gain must be recognized at the corporate level, the
double taxation effect would not have been so burdensome as to have
outweighed the advantages of the plan. Now, however, the risk of cor-
porate capital gains has been substantially reduced, and accordingly,
the plan may be much more attractive-even to the conservative planner.
D. Sales of Securities Which Will Produce Losses
The handling of sales of securities that will produce losses should
be similar to that which should be used for those which will produce gains
in most cases. It should be noted, however, that if the securities that will
be sold at a loss are distributed prior to their sale, the distributee-share-
holder will have little or no "tax loss" if he sells them shortly after the
distribution because their basis in his hands will be approximately equal
to the selling price.170 For this reason, it may be wise to realize losses
at the corporate level if they can be used within the carryback or carry-
over periods.1 1
VIII. OTHER METHODS OF REMOVING PROPERTY FROM THE
CORPORATION-REDEMPTIONS AND COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS
A. Redemptions
1. EFFECT ON THE SHAREHOLDER
At the shareholder level, § 302(a) sets out the general rule that if
certain conditions are met, the redemption of a shareholder's stock will
be treated as a distribution in payment or exchange for the stock. Sec-
tion 302 (b) sets out certain technical rules for determining whether the
distribution will be treated as a dividend or a sale or exchange.
A recent case"72 as well as the attribution rules of § 318 make
avoidance of dividend treatment in a closely held family corporation
extremely difficult. Accordingly, the only type of redemption which, as
a practical matter could result in sale or exchange treatment under this
plan is a complete termination of a shareholder's interest under § 302 (b)
(3). Because of the probable family relationships between the share-
169. See section II(G)(1) supra.
170. INT. REv. COD or 1954, § 301(d).
171. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1212(a).
172. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
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holders in this situation, the use of a complete redemption would be
dependent on qualification for waiver of the family attribution rules. 173
This requires satisfaction of the detailed provisions of § 302(c)(2)
which prevent the redeemed shareholder from associating himself with
the redeeming corporation in any capacity, other than as a creditor,
for ten years after the occurrence of the redemption. If earnings and
profits are not kept low, this type of redemption may have some applica-
tion here, provided that the rigid requirements of § 302(c)(2) can be
met.
Section 303 may also be used in special circumstances to qualify
a redemption for sale or exchange treatment. This section contains
extremely rigorous and technical rules for determining its applicability,
but in general it may be used only where the stock in question had been
included in an estate for federal estate tax purposes and only to the
extent of the estate and inheritance taxes plus funeral and administrative
expenses relating to the estate in question. If the owner-transferor or
another shareholder of the incorporated portfolio dies, this section may
have some limited application.
2. EFFECT ON THE CORPORATION
Section 311(d) provides the general rule that when appreciated
property is used to redeem stock, a gain will be recognized to the corpora-
tion. Exceptions, however, are provided for the two types of redemptions
discussed above (i.e., under § 302 (b) (3) or § 303). 74 For this reason,
a redemption will normally have no effect at the corporate level in this
situation unless one of the problems discussed in section VII supra arises.
B. Complete Liquidations
1. EFFECT ON THE SHAREHOLDER
Section 331 provides that the shareholder receiving corporate prop-
erty in a liquidation will be treated as having exchanged his stock for
the property received. As stated previously 75 a complete liquidation
could normally be effected on an installment basis if, as recommended,
the earnings and profits of the corporation are kept low; however, for
the purposes of completeness, the liquidation provisions will be briefly
considered.
Normally, a complete liquidation would not be desirable since the
shareholder must recognize gain to the extent of the appreciation in the
value of his stock in one or two taxable years. In addition, election under
§ 333 will not provide any relief here since the entire assets of the corpora-
tion should normally consist of money, and stock and securities acquired
173. These attribution rules are set out in INT. REV. CODE or 1954, 1 318(a) (1).
174. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 311(d) (2)(A).
175. Section I1(H) supra.
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after 1953.116 It should be noted that the date acquired for this purpose
is the date of actual transfer to the corporation even if the holding period
of the stock or securities in the hands of the corporation begins prior
to that time.177
2. EFFECT ON THE CORPORATION
Section 336 sets out the general rule that no gain or loss is recognized
at the corporate level where there is a complete liquidation. However,
the Court Holding Co. case" 8 and other decisions discussed in section
VII, supra, may present some problems in this area. One advantage of
complete liquidation over the informal installment liquidation suggested
above179 is that the difficulties resulting from these cases may be avoided
if the transaction meets the requirements of § 337.8 ° In addition, it is
likely that liquidation may, through careful planning, be brought within
the ambit of the Cumberland case even if § 337 does not apply.'
IX. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Although a complete discussion of employee benefit plans is beyond
the scope of this article, some of the problems arising as a result of the
particular nature of the incorporated portfolio will be briefly considered.
Although there are other types of fringe benefit plans'8 2 the treatment
here will be limited to qualified plans' 3 and medical expense reimburse-
ment plans since this writer believes that these are the types which could
most practically be adopted in the instant situation.
If such plans can effectively be adopted, an additional tax benefit
would result from forming a corporation to hold securities since such
plans may not normally be used by individuals operating as proprietor-
ships or partnerships.8 4
176. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 333(e) (2).
177. Rev. Rul. 58-92, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 174.
178. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
179. Section II(H) supra.
180. This section prevents gain recognition at the corporate level where the liquidation
is completed within twelve calendar months of the adoption of a plan of liquidation and
certain other technical requirements are satisfied. For a full discussion of this provision, see
BrrrKEa & EUSTICE, supra note 2, g 11.64-.71.
181. 388 U.S. 451 (1950). See section VII(C) supra.
182. For example, group term life insurance is provided for in INT. REV. CODE Or 1954,
§ 79.
183. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
184. The reason for this is that to enable the use of these fringe benefit plans there
must be an employer-employee relationship. Note, however, that so-called owner-employees
may be permitted to use self-employed retirement plans which are much more limited than
other qualified retirement plans. See INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 and the regulations
thereunder. But see Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968) which may provide
an argument that partners and sole proprietors may use fringe benefit plans more extensively.
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A. The Use of Qualified Plans
The tax advantages of using qualified plans is well known. The
employer receives a current deduction for contributions to a trust
established under such a plan"" and these amounts are not taxable
to the employee until they are distributed to him from the trust.80
In addition, the earnings of the trust are normally tax-free since the trust,
if qualified, is an organization exempt from federal income tax.187
The major problem which arises in this situation is assuring qualifi-
cation of the plan under § 401 in light of the fact that the only employees
of the corporation are likely to be its shareholders. One basic requirement
for qualification is that the plan be for the benefit of employees in general
and may not discriminate as to eligibility or benefits in favor of em-
ployees who are officers, shareholders, highly compensated employees,
or supervisors (frequently referred to as the prohibited group), ss
The following statement from one revenue ruling seems to indicate
that even a sole shareholder-employee may in some untold circumstances
be the only beneficiary of a qualified plan.
A plan will not necessarily fail to qualify merely because it
covers only the employer's one employee, provided, however,
that it is not designed or operated as a means of siphoning
profits to a shareholder-employee or otherwise limiting participa-
tion to an employee within a class in whose favor discrimination
is prohibited under Section 401(a) (3) (B) and (4) of the
Code."8 9
Grave doubt has been cast upon the efficacy of this provision by
the holdings of certain cases and other revenue rulings. One ruling' 90
found that the plan in question was not qualified where the nature of
the employer-corporation's business and its hiring practices, in combina-
tion with the terms of the plan, operated to effectively exclude all em-
ployees other than the sole shareholder. It may be argued, however, that
the facts of this ruling are distinguishable, particularly if the plan is
written in such a way as to provide for inclusion of any new employees.
In any event, the hiring practices in the instant case would not operate
to prevent possible future employees from participating in the plan.
Greenwald v. Commissioner,'9' however, may limit the effectiveness
of such arguments. In that case all the assets of an active corporation
185. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 404.
186. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402.
187. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(a).
188. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GUIDES FOR QUALIFICATION OF PENSION, PROFIT
SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS, pub. 778, part 4(a) (Feb. 1972).
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Rev. Rul. 63-108, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 87.
191. 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as Greenwald].
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were sold, and 59 of the 60 employees left the corporation, most of
them being employed by the acquiring firm. Part of the proceeds from
the sale were then used to redeem the shares of all the shareholders other
than those owned by taxpayer and his family, and the remaining funds
were invested in stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, and real estate. The
Second Circuit found that the previously existing "salaried only" profit
sharing plan was no longer qualified since the trust was being "operated
only for the benefit of one man: the taxpayer"' 92 and that it was not
likely that other employees would be hired since, because of the nature
and size of the business, the company had "no need of-and could not
well afford-more salaried employees."'193
The facts of the Greenwald case coincide closely with those of the
instant situation as both involve family investment corporations. A weak
distinction could be made on the basis that a salaried only plan would
not be used by the incorporated portfolio. Since Greenwald disqualified
the plan on the basis that it was discriminatory, the logic of the case
may be criticized on the ground that the basic concept of discrimination
must involve affording of preferential treatment to one or more employees
to the exclusion of others, and since that case involved only one employee,
how could discrimination exist?lH Whether such an argument would
succeed in permitting qualification in the instant situation is anything
but certain.
Another poorly reasoned decision in this area is Charles E. Smith
& Sons Co. v. Commissioner.19 The court held that a pension trust
was not qualified where the only person participating in the plan was the
sole shareholder-employee who was also the corporate president, because
the court found that the plan was not for the exclusive benefit of its
employees. The court "reasoned" that because of the high degree of con-
trol that the sole shareholder exercised over the corporation, he was, in
effect, the employer as well as the employee, and accordingly the pension
plan was benefiting the employer as well as the employee. The fallacies of
such reasoning seem obvious, and one commentator termed the case
'an aberration."'1 6
In light of the authorities discussed above, the planner must care-
fully consider whether or not to have the corporation adopt a qualified
plan. In making this decision, consideration must be given to many prac-
tical questions such as: What is the likelihood that the plan will be ap-
proved upon submission of an application for determination (Form 4573) ?
What chance is there that the qualification of the plan will later be suc-
cessfully attacked? Does the dollar amount of the expected tax benefits
justify taking these risks? Is the client psychologically attuned to the
192. Id. at 540.
193. Id.
194. CommyacE CLEAiG HOUSE, INC., PENSION PLAN GUIE 2346 (2d ed. 1971).
195. 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951).
196. CO MMCa CLEARImo HOusE, INC., PENSION PLAN Gumz 2293.12 (2d ed. 1971).
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possibility of disqualification of the plan after a favorable initial deter-
mination?
B. The Use of Medical Expense Reimbursement Plans
Section 105 permits an employee to exclude amounts received under
an accident or health plan for employees, and § 162 (a) permits the
employer to deduct such amounts as business expenses provided they are
"ordinary and necessary. 1 97 There has been some reported litigation
regarding the use of such plans in closely held corporations. The absence
of an express prohibition against discrimination in the code or regula-
tions, as well as certain legislative history' indicate that such plans
may be discriminatory and still receive the favored tax treatment dis-
cussed above. 199 The most difficult requirement for exclusion under § 105
has been that there be a "plan for employees." Since the payments
pursuant to such a plan are in the nature of compensation, it is also
necessary that they be "reasonable" in order to satisfy the ordinary and
necessary requirement for deduction by the employer.2 °°
1. THE "PLAN" REQUIREMENT
Although the plan need not be written and the employee's rights
to benefits under it need not be enforceable so long as it was communi-
cated to them, a plan must nevertheless exist. The amounts to be paid
and conditions of payment may not be determined on an ad hoc basis
or they will be included in the employee's income. 201 The plan requirement
can be satisfied merely by writing a formal plan with specific provisions
as to the amounts and conditions of payment, and having it adopted at
a director's meeting and placed in the corporate minute book.
2. THE "FOR EMPLOYEES" REQUIREMENT
The plan must be for the benefit of corporate employees in their
capacity as such.2 2 This requirement is somewhat nebulous, but the gist
of it is to preclude exclusion from the employee's income where the
payments are intended to be made to a person because he is a share-
holder, and not because he is an employee. Although this determination
must be made in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the following
factors have been considered in disallowance of exclusions claimed under
this section: (1) whether the plan covers shareholder-employees in
proportion to their stockholdings, and (2) whether the shareholder-
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958).
198. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 24 (1954).
199. Bogene, Inc., P-H TAx CT. Mci. DEc. 9 68,147 (1968).
200. See INT. Rxv. CODE op 1954, § 162 (a) and the regulations thereunder.
201. Larkin v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
202. Bogene, Inc., P-H TAx Cr. MEm. Dac. IT 68;147 (1968).
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employees are related.203 In the instant situation, the shareholder-
employees are almost certain to be related and the passive nature of
the business will make it difficult to justify, either economically or from
a tax standpoint, the employment of additional unrelated personnel in
an attempt to assure that the plan meets the necessary requirements.
The risk of adopting such a plan, however, is not great if the corporation
adopts a formal plan which conforms as closely as possible to the fore-
going rules, and it adopts a hedge agreement as a precautionary mea-
sure.
20 4
C. The Unreasonable Compensation Problem
Inherent in the consideration of fringe benefit plans in connection
with a closely held corporation is the problem of unreasonable compensa-
tion. Since the economic benefits conferred under these plans is in the
nature of additional compensation, they must be reasonable in order to
qualify for deduction under § 162. The determination of reasonableness
is necessarily a question of fact to be determined by all the surrounding
circumstances, 0 and there are therefore no hard and fast rules for
ascertaining whether compensation is reasonable. Although the amount
of work connected with operating an investment company will vary
depending on the size, quality, and activity of the portfolio, it would
seem that the amount of compensation that would be deemed reasonable
would definitely be limited.
This fact should therefore be kept in mind when terms of fringe
benefit plans as well as the amount of direct compensation is being
considered. Also pertinent is the fact that compensation received is nor-
mally taxable to the recipient irrespective of the deductibility by the em-
ployer.20 6 For this reason, a so-called hedge agreement whereby the
employee must repay the corporation for any amounts determined by the
government to be unreasonable should be adopted. If certain requirements
are met, the agreement will permit the employee to deduct the amount
repaid as an ordinary and necessary employment-connected expense. 7
X. VALUATION OF CLOSELY HELD STOCK FOR FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX PURPOSES
A. Valuation-A Question of Fact
Valuation of stock in a closely held corporation for federal estate
and gift tax purposes is anything but a clear cut process. It is a question
203. Id.
204. See section IX(C) infra.
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1958).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-8 (1958).
207. For the details of the requirements of such an agreement, see Vincent E. Oswald,
49 T.C. 045 (1968); Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 CuM. BumL. 50.
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of fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case. Since Revenue
Ruling 59-602' considers valuation for gift and estate tax purposes
together, it seems that the same valuation procedures would be applied
for the purposes of both types of taxes. That ruling sets out a number of
criteria for valuation. It begins by emphasizing that valuation of stock
in a closely held corporation is a factual question and proceeds to state
that the appraiser should recognize
that valuation is not an exact science [and that a] sound valua-
tion will be based upon all the relevant facts, but the elements of
common sense, informed judgment and reasonableness must
enter into the process of weighing those facts and determining
their aggregate significance. 09
B. Degree of Corporate Control and Marketability of Shares
A number of basic rules for valuation are also set out in that ruling.
One important factor is the degree of control which the stock represents.
Minority interests in a closely held corporation may be difficult to sell
and therefore a discount from underlying asset value may be warranted
in valuing such stock. Likewise, a controlling interest (actual or effective)
may justify a higher value. In support of this proposition, one case21 °
held that minority interests in closely held stock are usually worth much
less than the proportionate share of underlyihg asset value, and on that
basis allowed a 35 percent discount to be applied to that amount in
valuing the stock. Another case2 ' found that the valuation of shares in
a family corporation must be adjusted upward where they represent the
controlling interest in the corporation. These cases reflect that even if
some discount were allowed with respect to the shares in a closely held
"incorporated portfolio," the amount thereof would be somewhat re-
duced in a case where the owner-transferor continued to control the
corporation until his death.
Careful planning may avoid some of the risk of a higher estate tax
valuation of the preferred stock created in this situation by the owner-
transferor's control of the corporation. Obermer v. United States12
whose facts coincide closely with those of the plan proposed here reveals
some possibilities in this area. The corporation involved was a holding
company which owned mainly marketable securities, and the stock was
held 50 percent by decedent and 50 percent by his wife. The fact that
decedent's ownership was not sufficient to permit him or his estate to
have the corporation liquidated at will weighed heavily in the court's
decision to allow a 333 percent discount from the asset value of the
stock.
208. 1959-1 Cvm. Bu-L. 237 [hereinafter referred to as Revenue Ruling 59-60).
209. Id. at 238.
210. Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
211. Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
212. 238 F. Supp. 29 (D. Hawaii 1964) [hereinafter referred to as Obermer].
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Even if provisions of local law would not prevent the owner-transferor
from liquidating the corporation, the corporate charter (articles of incor-
poration) or by-laws could normally be made to require the consent of
a majority of all classes of stock in order to make the facts coincide
closely with those in Obermer. To make the facts even more similar to
those in Obermer, the owner-transferor could arrange to own the shares
50-50 with his wife. The gift tax cost and the effect on the owner-trans-
feror's overall estate plan should be carefully considered, however,
before this course of action is adopted. It should be noted that such
splitting of the stock could have the effect of mitigating the dangers of
inclusion of all corporate assets in the owner-transferor's estate under
§ 2036(a) or § 2038.131
In making its determination to allow the 33Y3 percent discount, the
court in Obermer took into account the following factors which seem to
be favorable for allowing a lower valuation of the stock of the "incor-
porated portfolio."
(1) The fact that the corporation was a personal holding company
subject to onerous taxes unless all its earnings were distributed was one
factor which justified the discount.
(2) The corporation in Obermer owned substantially appreciated
securities which could not be sold without the necessity of paying a large
capital gains tax. This heavy tax burden which would have been placed
on the corporation in the event of a sale helped persuade the court to
allow the lower valuation.
C. The Effect of the Value of the Underlying Assets
Also pertinent is the statement in Revenue Ruling 59-60 that in
valuing the shares of an investment holding company, the value of the
underlying assets of the corporation should be given great weight.
Thus, it would seem that a reasonable approach to valuing the shares
of a corporation holding marketable stocks and securities would be to
start with underlying asset value and make adjustments for market-
ability of the shares, the degree of control they represent, and the other
factors discussed above.
D. Comparison with the Value of Shares of Other Similar Corporations
Valuation of stock of companies engaged in similar businesses is
another factor Revenue Ruling 59-60214 suggests should be taken into
account. In this connection, it is a well known fact that the stocks of
mutual funds which are engaged in holding and investing in stocks and
securities frequently sell at substantial discounts from the underlying
213. See section XI infra.
214. 1959-1 u . BuI. . 237, 239.
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value of their portfolios.215 Certainly the activities of this type of business
are similar to those of the corporation planned in this article; however,
there are also important'distinctions.
First, the size of a mutual fund is far greater, and the shares are
more marketable than those of a small corporation holding stocks and
securities. Second, the management of a mutual fund theoretically has
a great deal of expertise in handling this type of business. These facts
would logically tend to justify a larger discount in the case of a closely
held investment company.
This rationale is supported by at least one decided case21  which
involved the valuation of stock representing a 23.5 percent interest in
the stock of a family owned corporation which held marketable stocks and
bonds. A 25 percent discount from underlying asset value was allowed
primarily on the basis of comparisons with publicly held corporations
having similar activities.
The court also stated that as a general rule the market value of a
listed stock is less than the assets value of such stock. It should be
noted, however, that this case involved the valuation of a minority inter-
est. In addition, a showing that the stock of specific public companies
reflected a discount from net asset value at the time death occurred was
apparently required. It should also be noted that in Obermer the com-
parison to a mutual fund for the purposes of valuing shares held by the
estate was rejected.
E. Summary and Conclusions Relating to the Valuation Problem
In any event, there seems to be substantial authority for discounting
the value of the shares in the incorporated portfolio to some extent. The
amount the valuation is lowered will depend on all the facts and circum-
stances of each situation, the availability of information to support the
discount, and the relative abilities of the advocates representing the
government and the taxpayer.
XI. THE DANGER OF INCLUSION IN THE OWNER-TRANSFEROR'S
GRoSS ESTATE UNDER § 2036(a) OR § 2038
When a person makes a gratuitous transfer but retains certain
"tainted" powers over the property transferred, § 2036(a) and § 2038
may operate to include such property in the transferor's gross estate in
spite of the fact that he has "given it away." These sections may apply
to the transfer of the common stock under the plan in the instant case
because the owner-transferor has retained all the voting control of the
corporation.
215. Blackard v. Jones, 62 F. Supp. 234, 236 n.2, (W.D. OkIa. 1944), Vass, Factors That
Are Presently Being Emphasized in Valuing a Closely-held Corporation, 38 J. TAx. 356
(1973).
216. Blackard v. Jones, 62 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. OkIa. 1944).
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A. Retention of Administrative Control by the Owner-Transferor
The possible application of § 2036(a) is illustrated by a recent
United States Supreme Court case, United States v. Byrum.217 In that
case, a decedent transferred stock in certain corporations which he con-
trolled to an irrevocable trust naming a corporate trustee and retaining
the following powers:
(1) The right to continue to vote the stock in the trust which, in
combination with the shares he continued to own, gave him a controlling
interest in all the corporations;
(2) the right to remove the trustee and reappoint another corporate
trustee at any time;
(3) the right to disapprove any disposition of the stock transferred
to the trust.
The Court decided that, despite these facts, the transferred stock should
not be included in decedent's estate under § 2036 (a). However, there was
an additional factor present-a substantial unrelated minority interest
in the ownership of the stock of the corporation. It is not clear what
weight the Court placed on this or any of the other facts in making
its decision, but until the decision is further interpreted, caution should
be exercised in extending it beyond its facts. 18
One important distinction that may be drawn from the plan in the
instant case is that the unrelated minority interest will probably not
be present. This of course would make the owner-transferor's degree of
control greater than in Byrum. It should be noted, however, that there is
additional authority in this area which does not seem to require the exis-
tence of any outside interest. In Yeazel v. Coyle21 the sole shareholder
of a corporation transferred 60 percent of her shares to an irrevocable
trust of which she was the trustee and retained the power to vote all the
shares held by the trust. Under these facts the court found that only
the named beneficiaries could receive the benefit of the transferred shares,
and therefore the transferor had no power to "enjoy" or "designate"
which would require inclusion under § 2036(a).22°
Because of the outright transfer of the common shares, two unfavor-
able factors in Byrum would not be present in the instant case: (1) the
right of the transferor to veto any dispositions of the shares, and (2) the
right to change the trustee. In addition, a minority interest, although
probably related to the owner-transferor, would nevertheless exist in
the form of the common shareholders.
217. 408 U.S. 125 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Byrum].
218. See id. at 151-68 (dissenting opinion) ; 26 U. MiAmi L. REV. 652 (1972).
219. 68-1 CCH U.S. TAX CAS. f 12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
220. See also Estate of George H. Burr, P-H TAx CT. M.. DEC. ff 45,364 (1945) where
stock transferred by a decedent was not included in his estate even though he retained an
option to acquire substantial amounts of unissued stock in the same corporation.
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B. Control and Enjoyment of Income from the Transferred Stock
Another positive factor is that, as a practical matter, the corporate
earnings would have to be distributed to the shareholders, including the
common shareholders, because of the personal holding company provi-
sions. 21 If these earnings were not so distributed, the minority share-
holders could probably compel such distribution in order to avoid the
prohibitive tax through a derivative action.222 To assure that the common
shareholders would have such rights, provision could be made in the
articles of incorporation for voting rights to vest in the common share-
holders after any year in which any part of the corporate net earnings
is not distributed. It should also be noted that the articles of incorporation
could give the non-voting common the right to receive notice of any
proposals for major corporate changes such as mergers, sales of entire
corporate assets, or complete liquidation, even though the shares would
normally not be entitled to vote. To assure that the common shareholders'
investment has liquidity, buy-sell agreements with arms-length terms
could be executed. Such an agreement should permit any shareholder, at
his election, to either dispose of his stock or acquire a controlling interest
in the corporation at any time. All of these factors would tend to estab-
lish the fact that the interest of the common shareholders is a true prop-
erty right which is not subject to the whim of the owner-transferor.
C. Exercise of Administrative Powers and Limitations Thereon by
"External Ascertainable Standards"
It would certainly seem that under these circumstances, the owner-
transferor would be subject to an "external ascertainable standard" in
exercising whatever powers he would have over the transferred property.
In Jennings v. Smith,2 3 such circumscribed powers were not considered
tainted under § 2038. This same rationale should be applicable by analogy
to § 2036(a) powers. Certainly, the owner-transferor's voting control, if
limited as suggested above, is not nearly as broad as the decedent's
"sole discretion" as a trustee to accumulate or pay out trust income
which caused inclusion under § 2036(a) in United States v. O'Malley.M
In another case2 25 the court held that the mere ability of the trans-
feror to delay the distribution of the benefits of the transferred property
to the ultimate beneficiary was sufficient to cause inclusion of the trans-
ferred property as a "power to designate" under § 2036(a)(2). The
owner-transferor under the plan in the instant case, however, does not
have the power to materially affect the timing of the receipt of the bene-
fits from the transferred property since dividends would be required
221. See section V supra.
222. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.131 (1973).
223. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
224. 383 U.S. 627 (1966), distinguished in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
225. Estate of Hector R. Skifter, 56 T.C. 1190 (1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
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to be paid currently by virtue of the contingent voting rights in the
common shareholders, and the buy-sell agreement would provide the
common shareholders with the ability to liquidate their investment
without great difficulty. The retained powers in this case could be
analogized to the mere administrative powers in Old Colony Trust Co.
v. United States220 which were held not to bring the transfer within
§ 2036(a). The court in that case emphasized the fact that the exercise
of the administrative powers was subject to external review by the courts
just as an abuse of the owner-transferor's control would be in the instant
case.
D. The Right of the Owner-Transferor to Salary
In Byrum, it was argued that the voting power gave the decedent
the right to income from the transferred property. Although this
argument did not prevail in that case, two other cases may be of interest
in this area. Estate of William F. Hofford227 and Estate of Pamelia D.
Holland228 involved transfers of stock with the retention of the right to
a salary from the corporation. In the former case in which the stock was
not included, the transferor continued to render services to the cor-
poration although the payment of the "salary" was not dependent thereon,
but in the latter case no such services were rendered and inclusion was
required. Also, in Holland, the payment of the salary was secured by
the transferred stock. One writer states that
the thin line of distinction which separates . . . [the Hofford
case] from the Holland case illustrate[s] the peril of making
gifts of stock in a family corporation and the extent to which
the Treasury may go to claim a tax under Sections 2036 and
2037.229
The "peril" of the situation may be alleviated to some degree by requiring
in the articles of incorporation that a hedge agreement shall be required
with respect to any salary paid to the owner-transferor.23 ° This would
seem to subject the payment of salary to an ascertainable external
standard and require that payment be made only for bona fide services
rendered, rather than as an incident to the transfer of the stock. Of
course, the owner-transferor should not have the ability to change the
requirement that such an agreement exist.
E. Conclusions and Recommendations
Despite the fact that the transaction may be structured as explained
above in order to allow the owner-transferor to retain voting control of
226. 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
227. 4 T.C. 790 (1945) (supplemental opinion).
228. 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942).
229. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxzs 151 (2d ed. 1962).
230. Section VIII supra.
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the corporation and avoid the application of § 2036(a) or § 2038, the
fact that the voting control remains in the owner-transferor, does leave
some uncertainty as to the application of these sections because of the
government's attempt to apply these provisions very broadly, and the dif-
ficulty as a result of the broad base and unclear language of most de-
cisions in this area of determining the attitude of the courts toward
interpreting them.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. One is to attempt
to avoid § 2036(a) and § 2038 initially by making the transfer of the
non-voting common stock nongratuitous (i.e., the common stock would
be purchased for its fair market value). Since, as explained previously,
that stock would be of nominal value, the purchase would not require
a large amount of capital. However, care should be taken in determining
the value of the stock to be purchased, and accordingly the possibility of
a formal appraisal should be considered. In addition, the purchase price
could be set at 25 to 30 percent higher than the established market value
to further assure that the transfer is for full and adequate consideration.
If the intended transferees are unable to pay the required consideration,
it may be possible for the owner-transferor to make a gift to them of the
necessary amounts. In that case, however, incorporation would have to
be delayed for a substantial period of time to avoid the possible applica-
tion of the step transaction doctrine which would combine the gift and
the purchase of the stock for tax purposes."
A second possibility is to remove legal control of the corporation
from the hands of the owner-transferor. This could be accomplished in
any number of ways. One possible example is placing the voting preferred
stock in an irrevocable trust and naming a friendly and responsible cor-
porate trustee who would informally agree to follow the owner-transferor's
advice on investment and other business decisions for the corporation.
Another possibility is a provision in the trust instrument that preferred
and common shareholders be represented equally on the board of direc-
tors. It is doubtful whether such arrangements would be subject to suc-
cessful attack under § 2036(a) or § 2038.21
If as many as possible of the precautionary measures mentioned in
the preceding discussion are used, it would seem likely that the ar-
rangement should successfully avoid § 2036(a) and § 2038. However,
should it be determined that these provisions apply, the owner-transferor
would be in the same position as though the scheme had not been used,
231. This would result in the transfer of the non-voting common stock being gratuitous.
For an illustration of the application of the step transaction doctrine see, e.g., American
Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949).
232. Cf. Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), supplemented by 1 T.C.
564 (1943); Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 542 (1945) (supplemental opinion); Estate
of James Gilbert, 14 T.C. 349 (1950); Estate of George L. Shearer, 17 T.C. 304 (1951);
Ruby Louise Cain, 37 T.C. 185 (1961).
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and its use does not foreclose other estate planning devices such as private
annuities, marital and non-marital trusts, or outright gifts of property.
XII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most of this article has dealt with the details and technical require-
ments of forming an incorporated portfolio. Also discussed at some length
are the expected tax and economic effects of the plan. It should be remem-
bered, however, that the incorporated portfolio, like other estate planning
techniques, must be suited to the individual for whom it is being con-
sidered. A person's financial condition or family situation may make the
plan completely inapplicable. Moreover, the client may not be psy-
chologically attuned to accepting the complications which will be injected
into the ownership of his property.
Nevertheless, the incorporated portfolio may be attractive to many,
although it is seldom if ever possible to predict with absolute certainty
the outcome of a plan which may ultimately depend on decisions of the
Internal Revenue Service and the courts. This writer believes that if
it is structured as recommended, the incorporated portfolio has a sub-
stantial probability of accomplishing its stated objectives.
